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 Foreign Direct Investment and Education Investment in Developing Countries  
By 
Nobuyuki Iwai, Stanley R. Thompson, and Priyodorshi Banerjee
*
 
We introduce a model to explain the economic rationale for the observed policy 
combination of a developing country (hosting foreign direct investment (FDI) through 
education investment (EDI)) and the interest of a multinational corporation (MNC) in the 
local labor quality when it contemplates FDI. Information on local labor is the source of a 
more efficient contract for the MNC with local labor, and the local government can 
benefit both agents through EDI, FDI, and information sharing. This strategy set is likely 
to be used by a country in the early stage of economic development. The education level 
chosen by the local government, however, will be higher than that which maximizes the 
welfare of local labor. In that sense, the government has the incentive to benefit itself and 
the MNC at the expense of local labor. 
                                                 
* Iwai is at the University of Florida; Thompson  and Banerjee, are at The Ohio State University. Foreign Direst Investment and Educational Investment in Developing Countries 
1 Introduction 
The role of informational asymmetries occupies a central position in the theory of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The existing literature has focused on the choice 
between FDI and licensing to a local firm in an environment where a multinational 
corporation (MNC) sells in the host-country (local) market (Ethier 1986, Ethier and 
Markusen 1996, and Horstmann and Markusen 1996). These studies have focused on the 
advantage of internalizing information about technology and local demand. When 
considering FDI in developing countries, however, the local market is often of limited 
importance. MNCs largely use these production centers as an export base to 
industrialized-country markets, as evidenced by high export-to-local-sales ratios (see the 
evidence below and also Hayami 2001 and McMilan et al. 1999). As such, two additional 
considerations absent from the literature are important: information about local labor 
quality and the role of governments (local or national).
1  
A compelling reason for FDI by an MNC is the availability of relatively cheap skilled 
labor, making production operations within a developing country profitable for the MNC 
(Wakasugi 1996). The payoff from investing in a developing country is thus dependent 
on the quality of the local labor force. Since an MNC typically has imperfect knowledge 
about the local labor quality, the MNC can gain if the local government shares 
information about its labor quality.  
This paper provides an economic rationale for the observed policy combination 
whereby developing-country governments host FDI by investing in education and sharing 
                                                 
1 This is true, especially for FDI in Southeast Asian countries. See Collins and Bosworth (1996), and 
Bloom et al. (1998) for evidence on East and Southeast Asian countries’ outward oriented economic policy 
and promotion of education. 
  1information (OECD 2002
2, United Nations 1999, McMilan et al. 1999). In our 
benchmark model, the MNC makes FDI in a developing country and offers contracts to 
local laborers. Precise information on local labor quality will lead to a more efficient 
contract, which is the source of information rent. Since the local government has superior 
information about the quality of the labor force, it exploits this advantage by sharing 
information with the MNC and taxing its profits. Furthermore, the local government has 
an incentive to use these tax revenues for education investment (EDI) because this raises 
the value of information and, thus, the profits of the MNC. The point at which the 
developing-country government starts investing in education we term the “take-off 
point.” The behavior of the take-off point is an important contribution of our work. 
This paper adds to the literature on the relationship between FDI and local 
government policy (Horstmann and Markusen 1987, Glass and Saggi 1999, Glass and 
Saggi 2002). Glass and Saggi (2002) analyze direct subsidies to an MNC by a 
developing-country government. In their model, the MNC possesses a superior 
technology compared to the local firms. The local firms can acquire the superior 
technology by hiring away the MNC workers, but the MNC can prevent this by paying a 
wage premium. Then the welfare-maximizing government may induce FDI through the 
direct subsidy aiming either for technology transfer or wage increases. In Glass and Saggi 
(1999), the impact of government policy is studied in a model which examines how FDI 
changes the distribution of wages and profits between host and source country with 
oligopolisitic industries. Horstmann and Markusen (1987) study whether an MNC 
interested in selling to a foreign market prefers to export, license production or invest 
                                                 
2 OECD (2002) emphasizes importance of the role of local government by concluding “The major impact 
of FDI on human capital appears to have occurred not so much through the efforts of individual MNEs as 
from government policies designed to attract FDI via enhanced human capital.” (p.122) 
  2directly in a reputation based model. The local government has the incentive to induce 
licensing production because it leads to higher consumer surplus and licensee profit 
which otherwise accrues to the MNC.  
None of these papers address the possibility that the host country government can 
have private information which is valuable to the MNC or study the information sharing 
and education investment policies. Further, by making the government one of the players 
which may either choose to maximize its own net revenue or the welfare of the local 
labor,
3 we more closely reflect reality in many developing countries, in that the 
government may place a higher priority on its net revenue over the welfare of local labor. 
Above all, we are the first to model the relationships among FDI, EDI, and the rents 
accruing from labor quality information. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, evidence is presented on the 
relationship between FDI and EDI in developing countries. We present some evidence 
showing that, relative to the local output market, the local labor market is more important 
for FDI in developing countries. Section 3 presents the basic structure of the model. In 
section 4, the MNC decision problem is analyzed. In section 5, we investigate the policy 
of a local government that chooses a level of education and a tax rate to maximize its net 
revenue. In section 6, the welfare effect of the policy is illustrated. We show that the local 
government policy can benefit both itself and the MNC at the expense of local labor 
welfare. We also study how government policy will change when the welfare of local 
labor is considered. Finally, conclusions follow in section 7. 
 
                                                 
3 In section 6, it is shown that the policy which maximizes net revenue and that which maximizes welfare 
of local labor, is quite different in our model. We further study the case in which the government 
maximizes the sum of these. 
  32 Evidence  
A positive relationship between FDI and EDI in developing countries is shown in 
Figure 1. Here we depict the average annual growth rate of FDI inflow and that of public 
spending on education between 1980 and 2000 for 20 countries.
4 The correlation 





























Figure 1. The average annual growth rate of FDI inflow and public spending on 
education (both as a percent of GDP). 
 
Although not shown, we calculated the average growth rate of secondary school 
enrollment ratio for the same 20 countries over the same period. The correlation 
coefficient with this measure of education investment and FDI is 0.33, one-sided p-value 
less than 0.10. Again, higher EDI tends to host more FDI. 
                                                 
4 Per capita GDP in all 20 countries was less than $10,000 in year 2000. FDI inflow data were from 
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  4For many industries, the importance of the local labor market relative to the local 
output market is dramatic. This is typical in East Asia. In 1995, for instance, 27.4 percent 
of laborers in the Japanese electrical products industry lived abroad, while for the 
automobile and nonferrous metal industries these numbers were 32.3 and 36.5 percent, 
respectively. In turn, FDI can be very important for the local labor market. The share of 
employment within the electrical products industry held by Japanese firms was 38.8 
percent in Singapore, 37.3 percent in Indonesia, 38.0 percent in the Philippines, and 28.2 
percent in Malaysia. For the automobile industry the employment shares were 34.3 
percent in Indonesia and 30.9 percent in Malaysia.
5  
The data above show that the local labor market is of considerable importance in the 
context of FDI in developing countries. What about the local-goods market as a source of 
revenue for the MNC? For Japanese firms within the ASEAN 4 (Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philippines and Malaysia), the proportion of exports in total sales in 1996 was 79.0 
percent for the electrical products industry, 57.6 percent for the precision machinery 
industry, and 54.0 percent for the textile industry (Fukao and Amano 1998). For all 
industries, 18.1 percent of the total exports from the Philippines in 1996 was by Japanese 
firms. For Malaysia and Thailand, total exports by Japanese firms were 17.7 and 17.3 
percent, respectively (MITI 1999). These data suggest that the local output market is a 
less important revenue source than the export market.  
 
3 Model Description 
Information about the quality of local labor plays an important role in our model. The 
local government has superior information on local labor quality (composition of the 
                                                 
5 All of these are data for 1995, cited from Fukao and Amano (1998). 
  5skilled labor) over the MNC seeking to set up a production site in a developing country.
6 
Because higher tax revenue flows from higher MNC profits, the local government takes 
advantage of the MNC’s interest in labor quality information by investing in education 
and revealing it (in another context, the MNC has incentive to inquire about the 
information). This strategy set (FDI, EDI, and information sharing) makes both agents at 
least as well off as without it. However, the education level chosen by the local 
government will be higher than that which maximizes the welfare of local labor. Hence, 
the local government would increase its own net revenue and the MNC’s profit at the 
expense of local labor.  
The sequence of actions in the basic model is as follows. First, the MNC makes its 
decision to enter based on the probability distribution of labor quality. Without other 
information it cannot compute the probability of positive EDI, so it enters if expected 
profit is non-negative. Upon entrance, the local government chooses the level of 
education, and reveals the information on education and tax rates. Then, the MNC 
implements a principal-agent contract with local labor. Finally, the local government 






















Figure 2. Sequence of actions in the basic model 
 
                                                 
6 We assume that the MNC does not have the option to license the local firm due to the high merit of 
internalizing technological information. 
  6The local government can contact the potential entrant but will incur costs of search 
and access. The local government avoids this extra cost if the MNC enters the region 
without this “before-entrance-contact.” However, if the expected MNC profit is negative 
but the local government still can profitably host FDI, the government will contact the 
potential entrant even with the extra cost. Then the sequence of actions is changed as in 




















and Tax Rates   
Figure 3. Sequence of actions when the local government engages in “FDI inducing 
EDI.” 
 
4 MNC Decisions 
4.1 Principal-Agent Contract 
Consider an MNC setting up a factory in a developing country and implementing a 
principal-agent contract with local labor. We first analyze the case with precise 
information of labor quality, and then the case with only the probability distribution of 
labor quality.  
The firm sells the product competitively as a price taker in the global market; thus, it 
can sell as much of the product as it wants at p = 1 (price is normalized to one). The firm 
is owned by shareholders with globally diversified portfolios; the global capital market 
affords complete hedge against the risk of operation at this developing country site. This 
  7assumption results in risk-neutrality of the firm with respect to profit from this site.
7 
Within the developing country, the labor supply for the specific industry is fixed (also 
normalized to one).
8  
There are two types of labor (skilled and unskilled). We normalize the reservation 
utilities for each type of labor to zero. While a laborer knows his own type, outsiders 
cannot distinguish an individual’s laborer type.
9 We can imagine the proportion of skilled 
labor  P  ( ) to be the indicator of local labor quality. We assume that P is 
increasing in the level of education. Thus P can also be understood as a measure of the 
level of education.  
1 0 ≤ ≤ P
In keeping with the terms skilled and unskilled, we assume that skilled labor suffers a 
lower disutility of effort. If the MNC knew the real value of P, it would implement a 
screening contract. The principal-agent problem is given by 
), (  w ) (         w
) (  w ) (         w
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where,  = type of labor (1 if skilled, 2 if unskilled),   is the production level of 
labor type i,  is the wage of labor type i,  is the disutility from working for labor type 
i, and F>0 is a fixed setup cost for the MNC. The constraints are standard; the first two 
are the participation constraints guaranteeing each type of labor their reservation utility, 
i 0 ≥ i x
i w i c
                                                 
7 Ethier (1985) used a similar assumption to have risk-neutrality of a firm. In the following adverse 
selection type setting, no other agent faces a risk.  
8 Alternatively we can assume that there is an unpaid local resource whose volume is fixed. We can also 
assume that an internal resource, such as managers sent from the source country, is limited. 
9 We assume laborers cannot engage in ex-ante signaling. 
  8and the next two are the incentive compatibility constraints ensuring that a laborer of type 
i prefers the contract  . We impose the following assumption:   ) , ( i i w x
 
Assumption 1:  is continuous and twice differentiable for    ) (x ci . 0 ≥ x , 0 ) 0 ( = i c , 0 ) 0 ( ' = i c  
and for  ,  0 > x ), ( ) ( 0 2 1 x c x c < < ) ( ' ) ( ' 0 2 1 x c x c < <  and  ) ( " ) ( " 0 2 1 x c x c < < .
10
 
Solving this problem for a given P leads to the first-order conditions (Mas-Colell et 
al. 1995), 
  ), ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 1 1 x c w x c w − + =  (1)   
   (2)  ), ( 2 2 2 x c w =
   (3)  , 1 ) ( ' 1 1 = x c
  ). ( ' 1 ) ( ' 2 1 2 2 x Pc P x c + − =  (4) 
The MNC’s problem yields the optimal strategy vector ( ,  ,  , 
).
) ( 1 P x ) ( 1 P w ) ( 2 P x
) ( 2 P w
11 Let  )
~
(
* P Π  denote optimal profit for the MNC when  .
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(P ai  is the profit 
from a contract with a laborer of type i, and   is the extra profit earned from a 




                                                 
10 These are standard conditions; disutility is increasing and convex in effort, and unskilled labor suffers a 
larger disutility than skilled labor. The assumption that  0 ) 0 ( ' ) 0 ( = = i i c c  is unnecessary but simplifies 
calculations. 
11 Equations (1) through (4) express the solutions even for P=0 and P=1 cases. When P=0, they yield 
 When P=1, they yield  , 1 ) ( ' 2 2 = x c ). ( 2 2 2 x c w = , 1 ) ( ' 1 1 = x c ). ( 1 1 1 x c w =  These are the identical 
solutions as in the principal-agent contract with one kind of labor. From Assumption 1,  and  are 
continuous. 
i w i x
  9through (4) and Assumption 1, we have   and   
(formal proofs are given in Appendix I). Furthermore, we have the following lemma: 
, 0 )
~
( 2 ≥ P a 0,   )
~
( ' 2 ≤ P a 0   )
~
( > P b 0   )
~
( ' ≥ P b
 
Lemma 1:   is increasing and convex in  )
~
(
* P Π P
~. 
Proof: See Appendix II. 
 
Next, we investigate the case in which MNC does not know the exact value of P. 
However, the distribution is common knowledge. Let f(P) be the probability density 
function of P, and let P  ( 1 0 < < P ) be the mean of the random variable.
12 Knowing this 
probability distribution, the MNC seeks to design the contract to maximize expected 
profit. It is easy to show that the optimal contract involves the same first-order conditions 
(equations (1) through (4)), but uses P  instead of P. This means that the MNC sets the 
target value to P .  
Given the target value, we denote ( ) ( 1 P x ,  ) ( 1 P w , ) ( 2 P x , ) ( 2 P w ) as the strategy vector 
chosen by the firm. This strategy successfully distinguishes skilled from unskilled labor 
regardless of the real value of P, implying that profits earned from skilled labor and from 
unskilled labor are fixed. The MNC can compute its profit from this contract for each real 
value of P. Profit from this strategy can be expressed as 
 
, ) ( ) (
)] ( ) ( )[ 1 ( )] ( ) ( [ ) , , (
2
2 2 1 1
F P P b P a
F P w P x P P w P x P F P P
− + =
− − − + − = Π
 (5) 
                                                 
12 One way of thinking about this is that the MNC is planning to enter a province or state in a developing 
country. While it may know the probability distribution of the labor quality for the entire country, it is 
uncertain about the exact labor quality for a particular province.  
  10where   and   are previously defined. Equation (5) gives the reservation profit of 
the MNC when it does not know the real value of P. Since 
() ⋅ 2 a () ⋅ b
0 ) ( > P b , the reservation 
profit is increasing and linear in P (see Figure 4).
13 If the firm knows the real value of P, 
the optimal profit is 
 .  (6)  ) ( ) ( ) , ( 2
* F P P b P a F P − + = Π
The gain to the firm from knowing the real value of P is therefore the difference between 
equations (6) and (5). We call this difference information rent and denote it as  ) , ( P P R . 
    ] ) ( ) ( [ ] ) ( ) ( [ ) , ( 2 2 P P b P a P P b P a P P R + − + = . (7) 
From Lemma 1, optimal profit   is increasing and convex in P. Reservation 
profit 
) , (
* F P Π
) , , ( F P P Π  is increasing and linear in P. These two are equal at  P P = , which 
means that, if the expected value P  is equal to the real value P, information rent is zero 
and, there is no loss of efficiency. At any other point  ) , , ( ) , (
* F P P F P Π > Π . Reservation 
profit is shown in Figure 4 as the tangency line at P  to the optimal profit. The vertical 
distance between the two is information rent which is shown in Figure 5.
14 Figure 5 also 
shows that information rent weakly increases for any P larger than, or equal to, P  as the 
expected value P  decreases. Formally, we have 








−  (8) 
Proof: See Appendix III. 
                                                 
13    F - ) ( 2 P a is the intercept and  ) (P b  is the slope of reservation profit in Figure 4. 
14 In Figure 4, information rent is larger on the right side of P than on the left side. But this is just because 
of the way the figure is drawn. The relative size could be opposite, and it does not affect our analysis. 
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Figure 5. Information rent. Decrease in P  weakly increases information rent for any 
level of P larger than, or equal to, P . 
 
A downward shift of P  shifts the point of tangency between  and  ) , (
* F P Π
) , , ( F P P Π  to the left in Figure 4. This shift weakly increases the information rent at any 
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  124.2 Entrance Decision 
The entry point of the MNC can now be defined, given that the real level of local 
labor quality (P) is unknown to the MNC. In this case the entry decision depends on 
whether or not its expected reservation profit is non-negative.
15 From equation (5) 
expected reservation profit is given as, 
. ) ( ) ( )} , , ( { 2 F P P b P a F P P E − + = Π  
We can use Lemma 1 to show that the expression above is increasing and convex in P . 
In Figure 6, the expected reservation profit for a given F is depicted as an increasing 
convex curve. Let  e P  denote the value of P  which makes expected reservation profit 
equal to zero.  
$ 
 
Figure 6. Expected reservation profit. MNC enters the developing country if  ) (F P P e ≥ , 
where . 0 ) ( > ′ F P e  
 
                                                 
15 Without any other information than the distribution of labor quality, the MNC cannot compute 








  13Any value of P  greater than  e P  will yield a positive expected reservation profit. As long 
as  P  is higher than  ) (F Pe  the MNC will enter the developing country. As the setup cost 
increases, the expected reservation profit decreases;  ) (F Pe  shifts to the right, and the 
range of P , which allows the MNC to enter, becomes smaller. In summary, the MNC’s 
decision to enter depends on the values of P  and F in the following way: 
 
Proposition 1: The MNC’s incentive to enter is increasing in P , and decreasing in F. It 
enters if  ) (F P P e ≥ , where  0 ) ( > ′ F Pe ; otherwise, it does not. 
 
Having defined the MNC’s entry problem when it is uninformed about the real value 
of labor quality, we now analyze the local government’s information sharing and 
education investment policy. 
 
5 Local Government Policy 
5.1 Education Investment 
As shown above, the MNC can gain from knowing the labor quality P (i.e., the true 
probability that a randomly selected local laborer is skilled). The local government can 
take advantage of that interest by sharing information with the MNC in exchange for tax 
revenues. Furthermore, the government can use these revenues to invest in education 
(EDI).
16 In this section, we shall study the behavior of a government that is assumed 
solely to care about its own net revenue (i.e., the government is assumed to maximize tax 
                                                 
16 Tax revenue is used for educational investment before production. One can think of the government as 
having access to credit at a zero interest rate. The introduction of a (small) positive interest rate does not 
change our results qualitatively. 
  14revenues less education cost). In section 6.3 we study the behavior of a government that 
also cares about the welfare of local labor.
17  
We begin by assuming relatively high expected labor quality and relatively low setup 
cost, so that the expected reservation profit is positive and the MNC enters without 
information sharing. However, if expected labor quality is low and setup cost is high, the 
expected reservation profit is negative. Then the MNC enters only if the government 
induces it with EDI and information revelation. Such a situation has important welfare 
implications, and it is investigated as the “FDI inducing EDI” discussed in section 6.2. 
The optimization problem of the local government, given FDI, takes the following 
form: 
, 0 ) ( ) , (
), , , ( ) , ( ) 1 (
subject to
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F P P F P t
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where, t is the tax rate on the MNC profit, P is the portion of skilled laborer after EDI,   
is the portion of skilled labor before EDI,   is the marginal cost of education, 




* F P Π ) , , ( F P P Π  is 
reservation profit for the MNC.  
This constrained optimization problem has a double principal-agent structure. The 
local government is the principal to the MNC, and the MNC is the principal to local 
labor. Given the principal-agent strategy of the MNC against local labor, the local 
                                                 
17 We assume that the only revenue source for the government is taxes from the MNC. We do not look at 
the possibility of income taxes on local labor. One can think of the developing country in question as a 
country where it is difficult, either for reasons of low prevalent incomes, or because of administrative 
difficulties, to levy income taxes.  
  15government chooses the tax rate and the education level to maximize tax revenue less the 
cost of education. The first constraint guarantees that the after tax profit of the MNC is 
larger than, or equal to, the reservation profit. The second constraint guarantees the local 
government tax revenue less the cost of education is non-negative. 
Also, note that we simply assume that the government tells the MNC the true value of 
P. However, this truth-telling can be made the optimal strategy with the following 
assumptions often made in persuasion games (Grossman 1981, Milgrom 1981). First, the 
principal (government) cannot reveal false information. Second, an agent (MNC) has 
rational expectations about the strategy of the counterpart. In our case, we can show that 
the government cannot increase its revenue by misleading the MNC to believe the value 
of P, which is higher than the true value. Then, an MNC with rational expectations 
should expect that the true P is the maximum value in the set presented by the 
government. So, there is no incentive for the government to tell a lie.  
From the first constraint, we have 
, 0 ) , ( ) , (
. 0 ) , ( ) , , ( ) , (
*
* *
= Π − ⇒
= Π − Π − Π
F P t P P R
F P t F P P F P
 
where  ) , ( P P R  is the information rent defined earlier, which does not depend on setup 
cost (F). Substitution of this into the objective function and the second constraint results 
in the following local government optimization problem: 
  ] ) ( ) , ( [ max
0 , dP P C P P R
P
P t P ∫ −  (9) 
 s.t.  , 0 ) , ( ) , (
* = Π − F P t P P R  (10) 
  . 0 ) ( ) , (
0
≥ −∫ dP P C P P R
P
P  (11) 
  16The local government chooses P so as to maximize the information rent less the cost 
of education. It then sets the tax rate so that the after tax profit of the MNC is equal to 
reservation profit at P.  
From Figure 5, we know that the marginal information rent is negative at any point 
P <P , and is positive at any point P >P . Also, marginal information rent is increasing 
everywhere. Marginal information rent (MR) and marginal education cost (MC), which is 
assumed to be constant, are shown in Figure 7. Because MR is increasing everywhere 









t P B P
 
Figure 7. As long as   there is no incentive for EDI; however, once   equals   
the government immediately jumps to  =1. This point ( ) is the take-off point. 
t P P < 0 0 P t P
P t P
 
The conventional maximization rule (MR=MC) does not apply here. Rather, the 
optimal value of P is 1 or 0, depending on at which point the information rent less the 
                                                 
18 The assumption of constant marginal cost (MC) is not essential, but is made for expository simplicity. 
Changing this assumption does not affect our arguments. Neither of the following two cases changes the 
arguments at all: decreasing MC or increasing MC, which intersects with MR only once. When increasing 
MC intersects with MR twice, the second intersection becomes the destination of the jump-process 
(explained later) instead of P=1. As long as MC is positive everywhere, we have the jump-process because 
MR is negative when P is low. 
 
  17cost of education is greater. But, since we assume that the initial value of P cannot 
decrease, either P=1 or the initial level   will be chosen.  0 P
Suppose that a developing country has the initial value  t P P = 0  so that the area B+C 
=A+B+D in Figure 7. The area B+C corresponds to the total information rent at P=1; 
A+B corresponds to the total education cost required to reach P=1 from  , and; D 
corresponds to the information rent earned by retaining the initial level of education  . 
Thus, the government is indifferent between choosing the initial level   and P=1. Any 
local government whose initial   is lower than   has no incentive to invest in education 
because its cost exceeds the rent it can earn. Any local government whose level of initial 
 is higher than   has the incentive to choose P=1. As long as   there is no 
incentive for EDI; however, once   equals   the government immediately jumps to 
P=1. This sudden change is because the marginal net revenue of the government is 
increasing everywhere, and it has no ability to reduce the value of P. We term this point 




0 P t P
0 P t P t P P < 0
0 P t P
t P
An interesting property of take-off point   is that it decreases as the expected labor 
quality 
t P
P  decreases. As shown in Figure 5, marginal rent to the right of P  increases as 
P  decreases. Consequently the take-off point   moves to the left because the cost of 




P  goes down, the local government has the incentive to jump to P=1 from a 
lower level of  . This situation is shown in Figure 8 in which the shift of expectation  t P
P to  ' P  causes a leftward shift of MR to   and   to  .   MR' t P
'
t P
  18$ 
 
Figure 8. The take-off point ( ) decreases as the expected labor quality ( t P P ) decreases. 
 
The take-off point is an increasing function of marginal cost ( ). In Figure 7, an 
increase in marginal cost will shift MC up without changing MR. Total education cost is 
now greater than total rent at  . So,   must move to the right. There will be no 
incentive to invest in education regardless of the value of   when MC intersects with 
MR at P=1. 
) (P C
t P t P
0 P
Setup cost does not shift the take-off point. This is because it neither changes the 
value of information rent nor the of education cost. But, setup cost does affect the entry 
decision of the MNC, and it has important welfare implications (investigated in section 
6.2). So far, given the principal-agent contract of the MNC, the local government jumps 
to the maximum level of education at the take-off point. The lower the expected level of 




1 O  P ' P
t P' t P
' MR MR
P
  19Proposition 2:  
The local government has no incentive for EDI when t P P < 0 ; however, once   equals   
it immediately jumps to P=1.   is increasing in 
0 P t P
t P P  and  .  ) (P C
 
This jump process shows some similarity to the popular multiple equilibria problem 
of economic development. Considerable literature recognizes the deadlock in the multiple 
equilibria of developing countries (Murphy et al. 1989, Becker et al. 1990). In Becker et 
al. (1990), there is little incentive to invest in education during the early stage of 
economic development so that the economy is trapped in the lower equilibrium. But, our 
model shows the opposite results are possible.  
Suppose that a region within a developing country hosts an MNC, where, the 
probability distribution of the labor quality within the entire country is known, but the 
exact labor quality of the region is not known. Then, the host country (or regional) 
government has an incentive to reach the maximum level of education from the take-off 
point. Besides, the take-off point gets lower as the known expected labor quality of the 
country gets lower.
19 The lower the expectation (country in early stage of economic 
development) is, the lower is the take-off point. This shows the distinct possibility of the 
jump occurring during the early stage of economic development, and may shed light on 
considerable differences in economic development among regions within a country. 
These remarkable characteristics of our model come from the role of labor quality 
information. In the early stage of economic development the expected labor quality is 
low. The higher the real labor quality relative to expected quality, the higher the value of 
                                                 
19 Note, however, that expected labor quality has to be at least as high as  e P  to host FDI. If not, the 
government has to engage in “FDI inducing EDI” which is analyzed in section 6.2. 
  20information. When the value of information transacted between the government and 
MNC is high, the former can increase its share of the profits, and has a stronger incentive 
to invest in education.  
 
5.2 Tax Policy  
Now we investigate the tax policy of the local government. Repeating equation (10), 
the tax rate t is adjusted so that the local government can earn information rent. The tax 
revenue is shown as 
. 0 ) , , ( ) , ( ) , (
* * ≥ Π − Π = Π F P P F P F P t  
This is non-negative because the optimal profit is at least as high as the reservation profit 
(see section 4.1). If the initial   is located on, or to the right of, the take-off point  , the 
local government will increase education level to P=1. So the tax revenue is 
0 P t P
. F P F F P t 0 ) , , 1 ( ) , 1 ( ) , (
* * > Π − Π = Π  
This is positive because we assumed  . 1 0 < < P  If the initial   is located to the left of the 




. 0 ) , , ( ) , ( ) , ( 0 0
*
0
* ≥ Π − Π = Π F P P F P F P t  
This is equal to zero when  . 0 P P =  With any other value of  , the above equation is 
positive. In summary, tax revenue of the local government is non-negative; it is zero only 
when 
0 P
P P = 0 , given    . 0 t P P <
 
6 Welfare Analysis 
  21In this section we investigate the welfare effects of FDI, EDI, and information sharing 
between the government and the MNC. There are two kinds of welfare gains from this 
strategy set. The first gain is from EDI and a more efficient local labor contract, given 
that the MNC enters the country anyway (efficiency gain effect). The second is the 
welfare gain when the MNC enters the region due to EDI and information sharing, which 
does not enter without these (“FDI inducing EDI” case).  We also investigate the policy 
effects on the welfare of local labor. 
6.1 Efficiency Gain Effect 
Here we retain the assumption that the MNC enters the region with, or without, 
information sharing. The optimization problem given in section 5.1 satisfies the incentive 
compatibility for both the local government and the MNC; the former earns non-negative 
tax revenue less education cost, and the latter earns after tax profit greater than, or equal 
to, its reservation profit. So, neither agent has an incentive to deviate from its own 
strategy, given that of the other (Nash equilibrium). Because the local government has 
perfect information, it can make a Pareto efficient contract with the MNC. The problem is 
to determine the situation in which each agent is strictly better off than without this 
strategy set.  
From the tax policy analysis in section 5.2 the local government earns positive tax 
revenue except when  = 0 P P , given  t P P < 0 . Tax revenue is always greater than education 
cost because the local government can choose zero education cost simply by retaining the 
initial level. We can conclude that the local government is strictly better off except when 
= 0 P P , given  .  t P P < 0
  22Can the MNC increase profits by acquiring information about local labor quality? 
From equation (10), the after tax MNC profit is always equal to reservation profit at P, so 
that  ). , , ( ) , ( ) 1 (
* F P P F P t Π = Π −  Without information sharing, MNC profit would be 
the reservation profit for the initial   which is given by  0 P ). , , ( 0 F P P Π  From equation (5) 
the reservation profit is a linear increasing function of P, so that  ) , , ( F P P Π > ) , , ( 0 F P P Π  
if, and only if,   > . In other words, the MNC is strictly better off whenever the local 
government is induced to invest in education (the case in which the initial   is larger 







The strategy set makes both the local government and the MNC at least as well off as 
without it; the former is strictly better off except when  = 0 P P , given ; and the 
latter is strictly better off when  .  
t P P < 0
t P P ≥ 0
 
6.2 FDI inducing EDI 
From Proposition 1, when the expected labor quality is low, it is less likely for the 
MNC (without information sharing) to enter the developing country. On the other hand, 
from Proposition 2, when the expected labor quality is low, it is more likely that the local 
government will invest in education, given FDI. This inconsistent behavior of the two 
agents results in failed opportunities for both parties. In the early stage of development 
(the lower expected labor quality), the local government has a stronger incentive for EDI, 
  23given FDI, but the MNC will likely not want to invest (FDI) in the region. Therefore, the 
local government has incentive to have EDI, contact and reveal the information to a 
potential entrant (even with extra cost) that, otherwise, would not enter the region. We 
call this action of the government “FDI inducing EDI.” 
In order for the FDI inducing EDI to be realized three conditions must be met. First, 
the MNC does not have FDI without information sharing (negative expected reservation 
profit). Second, the local government can gain by investing in education (EDI), revealing 
labor quality information to the MNC, and guaranteeing the MNC reservation profit. 
Third, the MNC provides FDI when informed of the tax rate and the improved labor 
quality due to EDI (positive reservation profit after EDI).
20 These conditions are given as 
  0 ) ( ) ( 0 ) , , ( 2 < − + ⇔ < Π F P P b P a F P P , (12) 
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A C P P b P a b a
A C P F P F
+ − > + − + ⇔
+ − > Π − Π
 (13) 
  0 ) ( ) ( 0 ) , , 1 ( 2 > − + ⇔ > Π F P b P a F P , (14) 
where A is the access cost of the local government to a potential entrant. Definitions of 
and  were previously provided. Combining equations (13) and (14)  ) ( 2 ⋅ a ) (⋅ b
  0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 0 2 > − + > − − − − + F P b P a A C P F b a . (15) 
The first inequality of equation (15) is more easily satisfied, as the expected education 
level (P ), the marginal cost of education (C), and access cost (A) are lower, and the 
initial level of education ( ) is higher. Also, the inequality of equation (12) is more  0 P
                                                 
20 There are cases in which the local government can induce FDI by simply revealing information. 
However, we focus on the case with positive EDI because the relation between EDI and FDI is the theme 
of this paper. 
  24easily satisfied as P  is lower. Hence, as long as the second inequality of (15) is satisfied, 
the lower P  is, the easier the conditions are satisfied.  
However, when P  is too low, a negative reservation profit results for the MNC even 
after positive EDI. This is because the lower P  is, the higher is the share taken by the 
government. The allowable range of P  depends on the value of setup cost (F). 
Combining (12) and (15), we have 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 P b P a F P P b P a + < < + . 
First, note that  P P b P a ) ( ) ( 2 +  is increasing and convex in P , and  ) ( ) ( 2 P b P a +  is non-
decreasing in P .
21 The former is smaller than, or equal to, the latter. The allowable range 
of F gets greater, as the difference between these,  , ) ( ) ( P P b P b −  gets greater. This is 
positive for  1 < P , but is getting smaller when P  is sufficiently high. It asymptotically 
approaches zero as P  approaches one. Hence, FDI inducting EDI is more common for 
the government with relatively low P . 
This claim can be illustrated in much-exaggerated measure by assuming commonly 
used disutility functions:  , () γ
γ / 1 x x c = ( ) , / 2 γ
γ kx x c =  where k>1 is the productivity 
difference indicator, and γ >1 is the common elasticity of disutility.













































                                                 
21 Increasing and convexity of  P P b P a ) ( ) ( 2 +  are directly from Lemma 1. Non-decreasing 
) ( ) ( 2 P b P a +  is from  ()
P d
dx
x c x c P b P a
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22 Disutility function for each type cannot have different elasticity because it would violate the conditions 
of  ,  and  ) ( ) ( 2 1 x c x c < ) ( ' ) ( ' 0 2 1 x c x c < < ) ( ' ' ) ( ' ' 0 2 1 x c x c < <  for  .   0 > x
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 which means that the 
allowable range of F gets larger as P  gets smaller. We illustrate the case with the 
quadratic disutility function ( , 2 = γ 2 = k ) in Figure 9. The shaded area in Figure 9 is the 
allowable range of P  and F to realize “FDI inducting EDI.” 
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Figure 9. The allowable range of P  and F with quadratic disutility function. 
 
Note that the allowable range of F is decreasing in P  everywhere. Also from Figure 
9, we can see that the allowable range of P is wider when F is relatively low. This comes 
from the convexity of  P P b P a ) ( ) ( 2 + . 
In summary, the FDI inducing EDI is more common when the country is in an early 
stage of development (low expected labor quality); its initial labor quality is high; and its 
education cost, access cost, and MNC’s setup cost are low. 
 
6.3 Local Labor Welfare 
In this section we investigate the effect of the strategy set on local labor welfare. 
First, we show the case in which the strategy set benefits local labor. Second, we analyze 
how government policy will change if it tries to maximize the welfare of local labor. 
  27When there is neither information sharing nor EDI, the MNC uses P  as the target 
value as shown in section 4. The total labor surplus ( ) without the strategy set depends 
on the initial and expected labor quality as  
0 W
))] ( ( ) ( )[ 1 ( ))] ( ( ) ( [ ) , ( 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 P x c P w P P x c P w P P P W − − + − = . 
Setting the target value to P  in equation (2),  
))] ( ( ) ( [ ) , ( 1 1 1 0 0 0 P x c P w P P P W − = . 
With the strategy set, the total labor surplus (W) becomes 
))] ( ( ) ( [ ) ( 1 1 1 P x c P w P P W − = . 
Again we used equation (2). First, we show that positive EDI is always welfare 
deteriorating for local labor.  
Whenever the local government has positive EDI it has an incentive to go to the 
maximum level ( =1). If there are only skilled laborers, the MNC’s strategy becomes   P
   
0 ) (    s.t.
) ( max
1 1 1






  ) ( 1 1 1 x c w FOCs = ⇒ ,  . 1 ) ( ' 1 1 = x c
23  
This means that skilled labor surplus is zero. Therefore, when there are only skilled 
laborers, all labor surplus disappears so that  0 ) 1 ( = W . On the other hand, the total labor 
surplus without the strategy set is positive because skilled labor has a positive surplus 
with 0<P <1.
24 Thus,  0 ) , ( ) ( 0 0 < − P P W P W  when  0 P P t ≤ . Therefore, the cases in which 
the local labor benefits from the strategy set are limited to those without EDI (i.e., 
).  0 P P t >
                                                 
23 The same result is derived by setting P=1 in equations (1) through (4). 
24 From Assumption 1 and equations (1) and (2), we can derive 0 ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 1 1 > − = − x c w x c w if 0<P <1. 
  28When the government retains the initial level of labor quality, the total labor surplus 
with the strategy set becomes 
))) ( ( ) ( ( ) ( 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 P x c P w P P W − = . 
Then the difference in total labor surplus between with and without the strategy set 
now can be expressed as 
)))] ( ( ) ( ( ))) ( ( ) ( [( ) , ( ) ( 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 P x c P w P x c P w P P P W P W − − − = − . 
From equations (1), (2), and (4) we can derive   is non-increasing 
in P. This leads us to that 
))) ( ( ) ( ( 1 1 1 P x c P w −
0 ) , ( ) ( 0 0 0 > − P P W P W  only if  P P < 0 . In conclusion, the 
strategy set benefits the local labor only if  { } t P P P , min 0 < . Local labor is worse off in all 
other cases. This is a very restrictive condition compared to the government and MNC, 
both of which are always at least as well off as without the strategy set. Besides, both are 
strictly better off in the case of positive EDI, while the local labor is strictly worse off 
with a positive EDI. 
How will government policy change if it tries to maximize the welfare of the local 
labor? This optimization problem is the same as shown in section 5, except for the 
objective function.  Now the government’s objective is to maximize the total welfare of 
local labor, so that 
  ))] ( )( 1 ( )) ( ( [ max 2 2 2 1 1 1
,
x c w P x c w P
t P
− − + −  (9’)   
 s.t.  , 0 ) , ( ) , (
* = Π − F P t P P R  (10’)   
   . 0 ) ( ) , (
0
≥ −∫ dP P C P P R
P
P  (11’)   
As previously shown, when there is only one kind of laborer (P=0 or 1), all labor 
surplus disappears. However, when 0<P<1, the total labor surplus is strictly positive 
  29because skilled labor has a positive surplus. Because the total labor surplus is a 
continuous function of P, there must be 0<P<1, which maximizes the total labor surplus. 
We denote this optimal P as P
*. 
First, if the initial level of education is higher than, or equal to, the optimal point P
*, 
there is no incentive for education investment. Because further education investment will 
result in reduced welfare of local labor, the government will maintain education at the 
initial level. 
Second, if the initial level of education is lower than P
*, we can define the take-off 
point again. Before the take-off point, the government has no incentive for EDI. But, once 
it reaches the take-off point, the government incentive is to jump to P
*. As before, the 
take-off point is increasing in the marginal cost of education and the expected labor 
quality.  
There are some important changes from the net revenue maximizing government. 
Under the current policy, the government jumps to P
* which is strictly lower than one. 
Because it jumps to the lower point than before, the budget constraints for education 
mandate the take-off point to be higher than before.
25 So, both the range where the jump 
process occurs and the distance of the jump are smaller than for net revenue maximizing 
government.
26 Any value of P greater than P
*, which happens whenever net revenue 
maximizing government has EDI, damages the welfare of local labor. In that sense, 
incentives are provided to itself and to the MNC at the expense of local labor. This result 
is in clear contrast to the conventional belief that skill building in the host country must 
                                                 
25 Remember that marginal information rent is increasing everywhere while marginal education cost is 
constant. Hence, the higher the destination of jump process is, the lower is the take-off point. 
26 When the government tries to maximize the sum of labor surplus and net tax revenue, the chosen level of 
education would be between P
* and 1. 
  30always benefit local labor (United Nations 1999). Finally, we summarize these results as 
Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4: Local labor benefits from the strategy set only if  { t P P P , min 0 < } . The 
take-off point becomes higher and the distance of the jump becomes shorter when the 
local government tries to maximize the local labor welfare. 
 
7 Conclusion 
We have developed a model explaining the observed policy combination of a 
developing country (hosting FDI and investing in education) and the interest of the MNC 
about the quality of the local labor force when it contemplates FDI in a developing 
country. Information on local labor is the source of a more efficient local labor contract 
for the MNC. The local government has an incentive to invest in education (EDI) because 
it increases both its net tax revenue and MNC profit. 
The important implication of EDI by the local government is that it suddenly jumps to 
the maximum level of education when it reaches the take-off point. However, the local 
government does not invest in education before it reaches the take-off point. An 
interesting finding is that the take-off point becomes lower as the expectation of 
education level decreases. This means that a country in an early stage of development has 
the incentive to take a larger leap, which heretofore has not been considered in existing 
multiple equilibria models. 
The strategy set (FDI, EDI, and information sharing) has two positive welfare effects. 
First, EDI and information sharing contributes to a more efficient contract between the 
  31MNC and local labor, given the MNC has FDI in the country. Second, with EDI and 
information sharing, the local government can induce an MNC to have FDI in the 
country, which otherwise would not occur. This “FDI inducting EDI” is more likely to 
occur for a country in the early stage of economic development. 
The strategy set makes both the government and the MNC at least as well off as 
without it, but it benefits local labor only under very restrictive conditions. Furthermore, 
when the local government invests in education, it must over-invest to the level that 
deteriorates the local labor welfare. So, the government has the incentive to benefit itself 
and the MNC at the expense of local labor. This result is in clear contrast to the 
conventional belief that skill building in a developing country always benefits local labor.  
 
Appendix I.1  
Proof of  .  0   )
~
(   0,   )
~
( 2 > ≥ P b P a
From Assumption 1, equation (2) must pass through the origin ( ). 
Equation (2) is shown as the 
) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( 2 2 = w x
) ( 2 2 2 x c w =  curve in Figure A. 1. The iso-profit line 
( ) has slope of one and passes through a point on the  2 2 2 a x w − = ) ( 2 2 2 x c w =  curve. 
From the incentive compatibility constraints we have  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 x c x c x c x c − ≥ − . 
This, combined with Assumption 1, indicates that  . From equation (3), and 
, we have 
2 1 x x ≥
2 1 x x ≥
   . 0 ) ( ' 1 2 1 ≥ − x c    (A. I. 1) 
Substituting this into equation (4) yields  
  . 0 ) ( ' 1 2 2 ≥ − x c   (A. I. 2) 
  32Hence, slope of the   curve must be less than, or equal to, one at  . This 
and Assumption 1 indicate that slope of the 
) ( 2 2 2 x c w = ) , ( 2 2 w x
) ( 2 2 2 x c w =  curve is less than one all the way 
up to  . Then the w-intercept of the iso-profit line ( ) , ( 2 2 w x 2 2 2 a x w − = ) is non-positive so 
that     . 0 2 ≥ a
From participation constraints and equation (1), we have  0 ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 1 1 ≥ − = − x c w x c w . 
This means that a skilled laborer has at least the reservation utility, and is indifferent 
between   and  . In Figure A.1 we draw the skilled laborer’s indifference 
curve ( ) passing through  .  
) , ( 1 1 x w ) , ( 2 2 x w
0 constant    a  with  ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 ≥ + = U x c U w ) , ( 2 2 x w
When  , the skilled laborer’s indifference curve is less steep than that of 
unskilled laborer at   from Assumption 1. From equation (3), the iso-profit line 
( ) is tangent to the indifference curve on  . From Figure A.1, it is clear 
that   This means that   When 
0 2 > x
) , ( 2 2 x w
1 1 1 a x w − = ) , ( 1 1 x w
. 2 1 a a > . 0 > b 0 2 = x , we have  0 ) ( ' ) ( ' 2 2 2 1 = = x c x c  from 
Assumption 1. Then equation (3), which is  1 ) ( ' 1 1 = x c , means that  . This leads 
to  , and   
0 2 1 = > x x
0 2 1 = > a a . 0 > b
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  34From Assumption 1,   Substituting this and equation (A. I. 1) into 
the above yields 
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Appendix II 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
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(proof in Appendix I. 1). Now we show that the profit function is convex in P
~. 










P P P P P λ λ − + = 1 0 ≤ ≤ λ , let the strategy vectors be 
( 1
~ x , 1
~ w , 2
~ x , 2
~ w ), ( ' ~
1 x , ' ~
1 w , ' ~
2 x , ' ~
2 w ) and ( " ~
1 x , " ~
1 w , " ~
2 x , " ~
2 w ), respectively. We therefore 
have the following results: 
)]. " ~ " ~ )(
~
1 ( ) " ~ " ~ (
~
[ )] ~ ~ )(
~
1 ( ) ~ ~ (
~
[ 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 w x P w x P w x P w x P − − + − ≥ − − + − λ λ  
)]. " ~ " ~ )( '
~
1 ( ) " ~ " ~ ( '
~
)[ 1 ( )] ' ~ ' ~ )( '
~
1 ( ) ' ~ ' ~ ( '
~
)[ 1 ( 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 w x P w x P w x P w x P − − + − − ≥ − − + − − λ λ  





( ) , '
~
( ) 1 ( ) ,
~
(
* * * F P P F P F P λ λ λ λ − + Π ≥ Π − + Π  




Proof of Lemma 2. 
The effect of a decrease in P  on information rent is given by 
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In deriving the result above, we used equation (3). Using equations (1) and (2), the above 
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Using equation (4) we can compute 
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